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Resumo
No momento em que os Estados Unidos estão fortemente 
divididos sobre os direitos reprodutivos das mulheres, o 
foco do debate passou da legalidade ao acesso a serviços 
de saúde. O binário (pró-escolha/anti-escolha) atinge mu-
lheres que procuram os serviços de saúde reprodutiva para 
fins que não o aborto. Nesse contexto, alguns autoprocla-
mados “conselheiros de calçada” abordam essas mulheres 
pelas ruas para convencê-las de que existem alternativas ao 
aborto. No entanto, as mulheres que optam por ignorá-los 
correm risco de ser repreendidas, perseguidas e humilhadas 
publicamente. Muitos estados aprovaram leis para proteger 
as mulheres que frequentam clínicas de saúde reprodutiva, 
mas uma enorme quantidade dessas leis foi declarada in-
constitucional pela Suprema Corte dos EUA, com base na 
Abstract
At a time when the United States is sharply divided on 
women’s reproductive rights, the focus has shifted from 
legality to that of access to reproductive healthcare 
services. The binary (pro-choice/anti-choice) overlooks 
women who seek reproductive healthcare services for 
reasons other than abortion. Self-proclaimed sidewalk 
counselors approach these women to convince them 
that there are alternatives to abortion. In this way, the 
women who choose to ignore oftentimes risk being 
scolded, yelled at, harassed, and humiliated publicly. 
Many states have enacted buffer zone legislation to 
protect women trying to access reproductive healthcare 
clinics, but an overwhelming amount of these laws have 
been struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court, based on 
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 1, p. 43-68, jan./abr. 2017.
Karla A. Vergara Pérez
44 
the First Amendment rules. This article argues that side-
walk counselors and activists’ protesting against abortion 
outside of these clinics is futile, defending that buffer 
zones around reproductive healthcare facilities help 
protect women’s privacy and their right to access so they 
may obtain the reproductive healthcare they are entitled 
to receive.
Keywords: reproductive healthcare clinics; abortion clin-
ics; first amendment; sidewalk counselors; Roe v. Wade.
Primeira Emenda. Este artigo argumenta que o protesto dos 
“conselheiros de calçada” é fútil e defende que devem ser 
elaboradas leis que protejam a privacidade das mulheres e 
seu direito de acesso ao serviço de saúde reprodutiva, a fim 
de que possam obter os cuidados médicos que têm direito.
 
 
Palavras-chave: clínicas de saúde reprodutiva; clínicas de 
aborto; Primeira Emenda; conselheiros de calçada; Roe v. 
Wade.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the forty-three years since the decision in Roe v. Wade,1 the abortion debate 
in the United States has continued to be one of the most fiercely discussed areas in 
contemporary American politics and society.2 Dr. Jane Hodgson, an abortion provider 
in the 1990s, expressed through her scholarship that she had never seen the inten-
sity of the United States’ divisions over reproductive choice despite having travelled 
to four different continents.3 In 2013, television host Rachel Maddow commemorated 
Roe’s 40th anniversary by highlighting the ongoing friction between demonstrators in 
favor of and against abortion rights and interviewing the clinical staff caught in the mi-
ddle of the debate.4 During the segment, Ms. Nancy Keenan, then President of NARAL 
1  In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court held that women have a constitutionally protected, fundamen-
tal right under the Fourteenth Amendment to a safe abortion. However, please note that Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg has challenged this interpretation of the case, arguing that the decision was less about a woman’s 
right to choose to have an abortion than it was about a doctor’s autonomy to carry out abortions. HEAGNEY, 
Meredith. “Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Offers Critique of Roe v. Wade During Law School Visit”, May 
15, 2013. Available at: <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-offers-critique-roe-
-v-wade-during-law-school-visit>. “Roe isn’t really about the woman’s choice, is it? It’s about the doctor’s free-
dom to practice… it wasn’t woman-centered, it was physician-centered.”
2  See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 947 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
3  HODGSON, Jane E. Violence Versus Reproductive Health Care: In The United States Organised Medicine Averts 
Its Gaze. British Medical Journal, London, vol. 310, n. 6979, mar. 1995. pp. 547-548. Available at: <http://dx.
doi.org/10.1136/bmj.310.6979.547>.
4  “Rachel Maddow Celebrates Roe v. Wade On Its 40th Anniversary”, Video, Huffington Post: HuffPost 
Media, Jan. 23, 2013. Available at: <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/23/rachel-maddow-roe-v-wade-
-anniversary_n_2533025.html>. 
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Pro-Choice America,5 remarked that, contrary to popular belief, the debate around 
abortion is “no longer about the legality” of it, like it was before Roe was decided, but 
that “it has now become a debate and a fight around access.”6 Anti-abortion and pro-
-choice activists have defined the nature of the abortion dispute in binary terms for ye-
ars, excluding, I suggest, one important group from the conversation: Women who seek 
low-cost, routine healthcare from reproductive healthcare clinics (“RHCCs” or “RHCFs”) 
that simply happen to offer abortion services.
Subpart 1.1 of this Introduction will briefly discuss the history of violence against 
RHCCs in the United States. Subpart 1.2 will then discuss buffer zone laws as reactive le-
gal mechanisms to protect access to RHCCs and their mixed results in the court system 
when challenged. The Analysis section of the article (Section 2 and all its subparts) will 
challenge the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasons for striking down buffer zone laws on a First 
Amendment basis by articulating the importance of such laws beyond the previously 
expressed concerns involving harassment. Finally, the Conclusion (Section 3) aims to 
provoke additional thought and inquiry into why, as a society, we are willing to uphold 
buffer zones in certain contexts, but our skepticism is heightened when it comes to 
women’s reproductive healthcare, particularly when abortion is involved.    
1.1.  A Violent History
The Arkansas physician who participated in the Rachel Maddow interview  — 
the only abortion provider in the state at that point  —  asked for his identity to be con-
cealed for security concerns.7 In extreme cases, anti-abortion activists have engaged 
in acts of violence against the RHCCs that offer abortion services and the physicians 
and staff that carry out the procedure.8 To put matters into perspective, a number of 
5  “NARAL” used to stand for “National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League,” but its name was chan-
ged to “NARAL Pro-Choice America” in 2003. NARAL Pro-Choice America Foundation and NARAL Pro-Choice 
America, Inc. are 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) non-profit organizations, respectively, dedicated to reproductive ad-
vocacy across the United States. See LEE, Jennifer 8. “Abortion Rights Group Plans a New Focus and a New 
Name”, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 2003. Available at: < http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/05/us/abortion-rights-grou-
p-plans-a-new-focus-and-a-new-name.html?_r=0>. See also “About Us, NARAL Pro-Choice America”. Avai-
lable at: <http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/about-us/>; “Mission Statements, NARAL Pro-Choice Ameri-
ca”. Available at: <http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/about-us/mission-statements.html>.
6  Supra note 4 (emphasis supplied). See also FINER, Lawrence B.; FROHWIRTH, Lori F. et al. Reasons U.S. Wo-
men Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives. Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive 
Health, [s.l.], vol. 37, n. 3, pp. 110–118, sep. 2005: “Public discussion about abortion in the United States has 
generally focused on policy: who should be allowed to have abortions, and under what circumstances.”
7  See supra note 4.
8  See idem. See also FREEDMAN, Lori. Willing and Unable: Doctor’s Constraints in Abortion Care, at p. 17 (Van-
derbilt Univ. Press 2010); HORVATH-COSPER, Diane J. “Being a doctor who performs abortions means you 
always fear your life is in danger”, Wash. Post, Oct. 29, 2015. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.
com/posteverything/wp/2015/10/29/being-a-doctor-who-performs-abortions-means-you-always-fear-you-
r-life-is-in-danger/>; ROHTER, Larry. “Doctor is Slain During Protest Over Abortions”, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 
1993.
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anti-abortion activists have committed numerous acts of violence since the 1970s, in-
cluding eleven murders,9 17 attempted murders, 185 arsons,10 and 1,495 acts of van-
dalism.11 For instance, in 1993, anti-abortion protester Michael F. Griffin was arrested 
and charged for murder in Florida after shooting Dr. David Gunn, a 47-year-old abor-
tion-providing physician who had just opened the Pensacola Women’s Medical Services 
clinic earlier that year.12 In 1994, John C. Salvi III walked into two RHCCs in Brookline, 
Massachusetts, killed two receptionists, and injured five clinic workers.13 Also in 1994, 
Paul Hill  —  a minister  —  shot and murdered Dr. John Britton, an abortion provider, 
and his bodyguard outside the Ladies Center clinic in Pensacola, Florida.14 Hill was exe-
cuted in 2003 for these murders.15 In 2009, Dr. George Tiller, whose Kansas clinic had 
been subjected to years of protest and harassment — including a bombing incident 
— was murdered in his own church.16 Recently, on November 27, 2015, as many as 
twelve people17 were victims of a shooting directed at a Planned Parenthood facility in 
Colorado Springs, Colorado.18 The accused gunman, Robert Lewis Dear, self-identified 
9  This figure has been updated to include the murders that occurred during the Colorado Springs Planned 
Parenthood shooting in November of 2015. SHOICHET, Catherine E.; STAPLETON, AnneClaire; BOTELHO, Greg. 
“Colorado Planned Parenthood shooting: 3 killed”, CNN, Nov. 27, 2015. Available at: <http://www.cnn.
com/2015/11/27/us/colorado-shooting-probe/>.
10  This number has been updated to reflect the four arsons that occurred in the summer of 2015 after accu-
satory Planned Parenthood videos were released. MORLIN, Bill. “Four Arsons in 74 Days at Planned Paren-
thood Clinics”, Southern Poverty Law Center, Oct. 2, 2015. Available at: <https://www.splcenter.org/hatewat-
ch/2015/10/02/four-arsons-74-days-planned-parenthood-clinics.>.
11  FILIPOVIC, Jill. “Abortion Clinic Protesters: “Sidewalk Counselors” or “Sidewalk Terrorists”?”, Cosmopolitan, 
Nov. 17, 2014. Available at: <http://www.cosmopolitan.com/politics/a32624/boston-abortion-planned-paren-
thood-protests/>. See also supra note 9. 
12  See ROHTER, supra note 8. 
13  See supra note 11; CLARKSON, Frederick. “Remembering John Salvi and the Brookline Clinic Shootin-
gs”, Political Research Associates, Jan. 15, 2014. Available at: <http://www.politicalresearch.org/2014/01/15/
remembering-john-salvi-and-the-brookline-clinic-shootings/#sthash.Q3abL41W.dpbs.>.
14  CLAIBORNE, William. “Two Killed at Clinic in Florida”, Wash. Post: Nation Special Report, Jul. 30, 1994. Avai-
lable at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/abortviolence/stories/florida.htm>.
15  GOODNOUGH, Abby. “Florida Executes Killer of an Abortion Provider”, N.Y. Times, Sep. 4, 2003. Available 
at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/04/us/florida-executes-killer-of-an-abortion-provider.html>.
16  See supra note 8.
17  See supra note 10; TSENG, Hsing; AEGERTER, Macradee. “Planned Parenthood shooting victims remembe-
red by family, friends”, KDVR, Nov. 29, 2015. Available at: <http://kdvr.com/2015/11/29/planned-parenthoo-
d-shooting-victims-remembered-by-family-friends/>; “Death of UCCS police officer in Colorado Springs 
Planned Parenthood shooting confirmed”, The Gazette, Dec. 1, 2015. Available at: <http://gazette.com/de-
ath-of-uccs-police-officer-in-colorado-springs-planned-parenthood-shooting-confirmed/article/1564442>. 
18  See supra note 9.
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as an anti-abortionist and confessed19 that he was acting as “a warrior for the babies.”20 
The President and CEO of Planned Parenthood of the Rocky Mountains, Vicki Cowart, 
called for an end to these kinds of violent attacks, stating that “[i]t is time to put an 
end to the dangerous rhetoric that has permeated our political conversations . . . [T]his 
violence, whether inflicted with words or with weapons, cannot become our normal.”21 
The former president of the American Bar Association and nationally prominent First 
Amendment advocate Talbot D’Alemberte noted in connection to the hostility surroun-
ding RHCCs: “This is not debate. It’s intimidation. If [the anti-abortion activists’] purpose 
is to communicate a message, they can be heard” without having to resort to harass-
ment.22 At a minimum, women who seek reproductive services from an RHCC, as well 
as the clinical staff, are subjected to harassment. Horvath-Cosper has stated that being 
an obstetrician-gynecologist has “made [her] a target for harassment online and in per-
son over the course of [her] career. Unfortunately, [her] experience is not the excep-
tion among [her] colleagues” despite performing a legally medical procedure in all fifty 
states.23 These acts of violence, though rare, instill fear in women and ultimately deter 
them from seeking professional reproductive healthcare from these clinics, even if the 
service they seek is not abortion.24 For the women who do seek an abortion, recent 
studies and reports have shown that women who do not readily have access to one 
attempt to either self-induce25 or to have the procedure done under more dangerous 
conditions that raise additional health risks.26 
19  It should be noted that the court has recently declared that the accused is unfit to stand trial. HEALY, Jack. 
“Judge Finds Planned Parenthood Suspect Unfit for Trial”, N.Y. Times, May 11, 2016. Available at: <http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/05/12/us/judge-declares-planned-parenthood-suspect-unfit-for-trial.html?smpro-
d=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=0.>. 
20  HUGHES, Trevor. “Accused Planned Parenthood Gunman Says He’s Guilty”, USA Today, Dec. 9, 2015. 
Available at: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/12/09/accused-planned-parenthood-gunman-
-could-face-death-penalty-charges--3-deaths/77038542/.>. 
21  Idem.
22  SAVAGE, David G. “Justices to Enter Abortion Clinic’s ‘Buffer Zone’: Supreme Court: A case of ‘free 
speech versus free access’ at a surgical center is high court’s first chance to weigh aggressive protesters’ First 
Amendment rights”, L.A. Times, Apr. 24, 1994. Available at: <http://articles.latimes.com/1994-04-24/news/mn-
49919_1_supreme-court/2>.
23  HORVATH-COSPER, supra note 8.
24  See supra note 8.
25  See, e.g., BEUSMAN, Callie. “100,000 Women in Texas Have Tried to Self-Induce an Abortion, New Re-
port Says”, Broadly, Nov. 17, 2015. Available at: <https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/100000-women-in-
-texas-have-tried-to-self-induce-an-abortion>.
26  During the oral arguments for Roe v. Wade on December 13, 1971, Attorney Sarah R. Weddington, arguing 
on behalf of the Plaintiffs, brought to light the consequences of obstructing access to safe abortions: “In the 
absence of abortions, or legal medically safe abortions, women often resort [sic] to the illegal abortions, which 
certainly carry risks of death, all the side effects, such as severe infections, permanent sterility, all the complica-
tions that result. And, in fact, if the woman is unable to get [. . .] a legal abortion [. . .] she can do a self-abortion, 
which is [. . .] by far the most dangerous.” Oral Argument at 12:45, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-
18), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-18. See KHAZAN, Olga. “Texas Women Are Inducing Their Own 
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Physicians who provide abortion services also often end up fearing for their fa-
mily members’ lives as well as their own.27 The recent Colorado shooting casted light 
upon an issue advocates for women’s reproductive healthcare know all too well: Appro-
aching these so-called abortion clinics is anything but safe.28 On March 30th, 2016, the 
Peoria County Airport in Illinois had to be shut down after the authorities discovered 
“suspicious items” in a woman’s carry-on luggage.29 After further investigation, the au-
thorities discovered that the woman was an employee of the National Abortion Fede-
ration (NAF), whose job required her to travel around the country training RHCC staff 
members on how to identify bombs so they could protect themselves and patients 
from attacks; she uses the dynamite-resembling dog toys found in her carry-on lugga-
ge as training devices.30 
Despite the fact that Roe and its progeny are still good law,31 women in the U.S. 
have a hard time accessing reproductive healthcare at RHCFs without feeling like their 
privacy and safety are threatened by the anti-abortion activists who surround these 
clinics. These attacks have driven abortion providers to demand legislation that guaran-
tees safe, unobstructed access to RHCCs,32 such as buffer zone laws, which have had an 
underwhelming rate of success across the country due to First Amendment concerns.
In 1994, then President Clinton signed the Free Access to Clinic Entrances Act 
(“FACE Act”) in an effort to put an end to acts of violence against RHCFs.33 The FACE 
Act prohibited anyone from threatening or forcibly interfering with people entering 
an RHCF or intentionally damaging the clinic.34 Since then, many states have passed 
protective buffer zone laws that prohibit anti-abortion activists from harassing women 
Abortions”, The Atlantic, Nov. 17, 2015. Available at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/11/
texas-self-abort/416229/.>.
27  See HORVATH-COSPER, supra note 8.
28  See idem.; ROHTER, supra note 8.
29  MADDOW, Rachel. “Donald Trump Exposes Truth of Anti-Abortion Politics”, Video, MSNBC News: The 
Rachel Maddow Show, Apr. 1, 2016. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wkV7H1NEJk4>.LA-
MANSKY, Katrina. “Dog toys, and safety training items for abortion clinics, are what shut down Peoria 
airport”, WQAD, Mar. 31, 2016. Available at: <http://wqad.com/2016/03/31/photo-shows-what-tsa-agents-
-saw-inside-peoria-airport-passengers-bag-that-prompted-evacuation/>.
30  See supra note 29. 
31  The holding in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), later solidi-
fied the central holding of Roe v. Wade, namely, that a woman has a constitutionally protected right to seek an 
abortion until fetal viability.
32  ALBERT, Richard. Protest, Proportionality, and the Politics of Privacy: Mediating the Tension Between the Ri-
ght of Access to Abortion Clinics and Free Religious Expression in Canada and the United States. Loyola of Los 
Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, Los Angeles, vol. 27, n. 1, p. 1-62, jan./apr. 2005. p. 9. 
33  See FILIPOVIC, supra note 11.
34  Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248.
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who approach RHCCs.35 Buffer zones,36 as discussed in this article, are areas surroun-
ding RHCC property lines in order to keep both anti-abortion activists and peaceful 
counselors away from the clinics’ premises, and therefore minimize the possibility of 
harassment and violence towards the women entering the clinics.37 Courts have recog-
nized that there are two types of buffer zones: Fixed and floating. Fixed buffer zones 
surround a particular, immovable area (such as a parking lot, a driveway, an entrance, 
a facility, etc.); floating buffer zones, on the other hand, apply to persons, vehicles, or 
mobile entities entering or exiting the protected facilities.38 Buffer zones are employed 
successfully in settings unrelated to RHCFs. The question is why. 
1.2.  The Buffer Zone Tug O’ Wars
The jurisprudence around buffer zone laws has not always held that a person’s 
right to free speech outweighs another’s right to privacy.39 Frisby v. Schultz was one of 
the first cases to deal with this difficult tension. In that case, two abortion opponents 
challenged a city ordinance40 which banned picketing “before or about” any particu-
lar residence because they wanted to protest abortion on a public street outside an 
abortion-providing physician’s home.41 They had engaged in this activity “on at least six 
occasions” between April and May of 1985 with a group of eleven to forty people.42 Al-
though the picketing was “generally orderly and peaceful,” it had generated “substantial 
35  See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122(3) (1999); M.G.L.A. 266 § 120E½ (2001). See FILIPOVIC, supra note 11. 
36  Buffer Zone, Merriam-Webster’s Learner’s Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/buf-
fer%20zone (last visited Apr. 18, 2016). The term “buffer zone” as “an area that keeps two things separated;” “a 
neutral area separating conflicting forces;” and “an area designed to separate.”
37  EDWARDS, Jamie. McGuire v. Reilly: The First Amendment and Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones in the Wake of Hill 
v. Colorado. UC Davis Law Review, Davis, vol. 36, n. 3, p. 787-812, feb. 2003. p. 789. See also BASSETT, Laura. 
“Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones Crumble Around the Country”, Huffington Post, Jul. 9, 2014. Available at: 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/09/abortion-clinic-buffer-zo_n_5571516.html>.
38  Rodney A. Smolla, 1 Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 13:38, Chapter 13: Free Speech and Civil 
Rights Enforcement, at p. 2. 
39  See, e.g., the following seminal decisions, which discuss access to abortion: McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 
2518 (2014), Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 
357 (1997), Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994), Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973). For practical purposes, I will only discuss at length the cases that are most relevant to my analysis for 
this paper. 
40  The relevant text of the ordinance read as follows: “It is unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before 
or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brookfield.” The ordinance also states the 
primary purpose of this ban: “the protection and preservation of the home” through assurance “that members 
of the community enjoy in their homes and dwellings a feeling of well-being, tranquility, and privacy.” Frisby, 
487 U.S. at p. 477.
41  Idem. at p. 476. 
42  Idem.
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controversy and numerous complaints.”43 The Court reasoned that the ordinance left 
“ample alternative channels of communication” (i.e., it allowed protestors to enter and 
march through neighborhoods, alone or in groups, distribute literature from door to 
door, and contact the residents by telephone).44 Because there were ample alternative 
channels of communication, the Court concluded that the city ordinance was narrowly 
tailored.45 The Court, however, also recognized that “protection of the unwilling listener” 
is one of the State’s paramount concerns when it comes to residential privacy.46 Since 
the ordinance was narrowly tailored to ban protesting targeted at a particular residen-
ce in order to protect the privacy of the home, which is considered a “substantial and 
justifiable” state interest, the Court concluded that the ordinance was valid.47    
In the case of Hill v. Colorado,48 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld in a 6-3 opinion 
a Colorado buffer zone statute that makes it unlawful for any person within 100 feet 
of any healthcare facility entrance to “knowingly approach” within eight feet of ano-
ther person without their consent “for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, 
displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such 
other person…” if the person is unwilling to accept and listen to the message.49 The 
Supreme Court upheld the statute, finding that “[t]he State of Colorado ha[d] respon-
ded to its substantial and legitimate interest in protecting these persons from unwan-
ted encounters, confrontations, and even assaults by enacting an exceedingly modest 
restriction on the speakers’ ability to approach.”50 Underlying the Hill decision, howe-
ver, was an incredibly important leap forward: The Court’s explicit acknowledgment of 
the “significant difference between state restrictions on a speaker’s right to address a 
willing audience and those that protect listeners from unwanted communication” when 
addressing the government’s significant interest prong of the strict scrutiny analysis.51 
Furthermore, the Court explicitly recognized that “[p]ersons who are attempting to en-
ter health care facilities – for any purpose – are often in particularly vulnerable physical 
and emotional conditions.”52 Hospitals, it reasoned, are facilities “where human ailments 
43  Idem.
44  Idem. at p. 484.
45  See idem. at pp. 482, 487-88.
46  Idem. at p. 484 (citing to Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980): “The State’s interest in protecting the 
well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.”
47  See idem. at p. 488. See also COWAN, Kristen G. The Tailoring of Statutory Bubble Zones: Balancing Free 
Speech and Patients’ Rights. Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, Boston, vol. 91, n. 2, pp. 385-428, dic./
mar. 2000/2001. p. 385.
48  Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
49  Idem. at pp. 707-08.
50  Idem. at p. 729.
51  Idem. at pp. 715-16 (emphasis supplied).
52  Idem. at p. 729 (emphasis supplied). 
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are treated, where patients and relatives alike often are under emotional strain and 
worry, where pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets of the day’s activity, 
and where the patient and [her] family . . . need a restful, uncluttered, relaxing, and helpful 
atmosphere.”53
As a result of the recurring violence RHCCs were being subjected to around the 
state, the Massachusetts legislature first enacted the Massachusetts Reproductive He-
alth Care Facilities Act (hereafter “the Act”) in 2000, which is coded at Chapter 266, Sec-
tion 120E½, of the Massachusetts General Laws.54 Modeled after Colorado’s buffer zone 
law,55 the Act’s subsection (b) prescribed two buffer zones: One fixed and one floating. 
The statute made it illegal for persons “in the public way or sidewalk area” within an 
18-foot radius of an RHCF entrance to “knowingly approach another person . . . within 
six feet . . . unless such other person . . . consents” for the purpose of passing a leaflet, 
displaying a sign, engage in oral protest, education, or counseling.56 The buffer zone 
statute allowed for anybody to step into the 18-foot fixed buffer zone area, but once 
within it, every individual was subject to six-foot floating buffer zone, which could not 
be penetrated unless the other person consented.57 
By 2007, it had become evident to law officials that the floating buffer zone por-
tion of the statute was being routinely violated by protesters who continued to appro-
ach patients and clinical staff without due consent; they consequently rendered the 
statute ineffective and unenforceable.58 The Massachusetts legislature introduced the 
revised statute that same year, which replaced the floating/fixed buffer zone rule with a 
fixed 35-foot buffer zone.59 The revised provision made it illegal to “knowingly enter or 
remain on a public way or sidewalk adjacent to a reproductive health care facility within 
a [fixed] radius of 35 feet of any portion of an entrance, exit or driveway . . .”60 of “any 
place, other than a hospital, where abortions are performed”61 during the facility’s bu-
siness hours and only if the radius is “clearly marked and posted.”62 The revised statute 
faced anti-abortionist backlash almost immediately. In January 2008, about two mon-
ths after the revised statute had gone into effect, the Plaintiffs filed the initial action 
challenging the constitutionality of the Act.63
53  Idem. at pp. 728-29 (quoting NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 783-84 (1979)) (emphases supplied).
54  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at p. 2525. 
55  Idem. 
56  M.G.L.A. 266 § 120E½(b); 134 S. Ct. at p. 2525.
57  134 S. Ct. at p. 2525.
58  Idem. at pp. 2525-26. 
59  Idem. at p. 2526.
60  M.G.L.A. 266 § 120E½(b), invalidated by McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (alteration supplied).
61  M.G.L.A. 266 § 120E½(a); 134 S. Ct. at p. 2526. 
62  M.G.L.A. 266 § 120E½(c); 134 S. Ct. at p. 2526.
63  Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, McCullen v. Coakley, 708 F.3d 1 (2013) (No. 12-1334), 2012 WL 1899832, at *2.
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The First Circuit Court held that the Act was not unconstitutionally vague or an 
unlawful constriction of free speech based on three main arguments.64 First, that the 
Act was content-neutral because it was “enacted in response to legitimate safety and 
law enforcement concerns” and “without reference to the content of any speech,” thus 
serving “a legitimate governmental interest unrelated to expressive content.”65 Second, 
the Court held that the Act successfully remedied “the ineffectiveness of the preexisting 
law” by being “narrowly tailored to serve important governmental interests in enhan-
cing public safety around RHCF entrances” and “without burdening substantially more 
speech than necessary.”66 And third, the Court held that the Act leaves “open ample 
alternative channels of communication, because it ‘places no burden at all on the plain-
tiffs’ activities outside the 35-foot buffer zone.’”67After the lower courts upheld the cons-
titutionality of the Act based on the time, place, and manner doctrine, the Plaintiffs filed 
a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court on March 25, 2013.68 
Time, place, and manner restrictions provide that the right to free speech gran-
ted by the First Amendment is not absolute.69 A State’s time, place, and manner re-
gulations are constitutional if they (1) do not regulate speech based on its content or 
subject matter, (2) are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, 
and (3) leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.70 
The simple yet loaded question before the Supreme Court was whether the statute 
violated Petitioners’ free speech rights under the First Amendment.71 During oral argu-
ments, the State of Massachusetts articulated an array of reasons as to why the statute 
should be allowed to stand under the time, place, and manner doctrine.72 Even though 
the State never explicitly mentioned harassment, they alluded to the violent history 
clinics have been subjected to.73 To rebut, Petitioners argued that they were simply si-
dewalk counselors seeking to engage the women and discuss alternatives outside an 
abortion with them.74 The two competing characterizations of the nature of Petitio-
ners’ intentions and actions captured the attention of Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia, 
64  See Brief for the Defendants-Appellees, McCullen v. Coakley, 708 F.3d 1 (2013) (No. 12-1334), 2012 WL 
2872265, at *2.
65  Idem. at *3.
66  Idem.
67  Idem. (citing to McCullen v. Coakley, 571 F.3d 167, 176-78 (1st Cir. 2009)).
68  See Brief for Petitioner, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (No. 12-1168), 2013 WL 1247969. 
69  See COWAN, supra note 47, at pp. 385-86.
70  Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648 
(1984); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 782-83 (1989). 
71  134 S. Ct. at p. 2525.
72  Oral Argument at 4:08, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1168. 
73  Idem. at 43:29.
74  See idem. at 37:55.
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eventually persuading the bench to arrive at the same conclusion: “Petitioners are not 
protesters.”75 
When the unanimous McCullen v. Coakley decision was announced, supporters 
of the buffer zone statute quickly pointed out the “irony” and “hypocrisy” embedded 
in the Court’s ruling.76 For instance, Marty Walz, then CEO of the Planned Parenthood 
League of Massachusetts, stated: “By striking down the buffer zone law today, the Su-
preme Court has taken away an essential measure to protect public safety and health 
care access in our state.” 77 Another piece stated, “It’s virtually impossible to square the 
law enforcement definition of illegal protest with the snuggly warm vision of political 
protest put forth by a unanimous Supreme Court only two months ago in McCullen v. 
Coakley.”78 The statement made by the McCullen decision, however, went beyond sim-
ply making it more difficult for women to access reproductive healthcare. I submit that 
the Court’s decision implicitly affirmed that, as a society, we are willing to place a higher 
value on free speech than on women’s right to privacy when it comes to their reproduc-
tive healthcare. The question, once again, is why. 
2. ANALYSIS 
2.1.  RHCCs: Much More than “Abortion Clinics”
After Roe made access to a safe abortion a constitutional right, the medical pro-
fession had to determine how abortion care would be provided.79 Lori Freedman  —  a 
scholar who explores the intersection between abortion politics and the medical pro-
fession  —  argues that, “given the larger threats to medical autonomy after abortion 
became legal, abortion services seem to garner support from mainstream medical as-
sociations only at moments when medical autonomy was threatened.”80 Abortion was 
75  134 S. Ct. at 2536 (emphasis supplied). See also Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, supra note 63, at *3-4: “Plaintiffs 
are seven individual Massachusetts residents who engage in peaceful speech outside abortion clinics in the 
State. . . Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek to offer women love, support, and information about alternatives to abor-
tion, as well as assistance in carrying their babies to term.”
76  See, e.g., MILLIGAN, Susan. “High Court Hypocrisy’, U.S. News: Opinion, Jun. 27, 2014. Available at: <http://
www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/susan-milligan/2014/06/27/supreme-court-bans-abortion-clinic-buffer-
-zones-but-keeps-its-own>. LOGIURATO, Brett. “Here’s the Ultimate Irony of the Supreme Court Banning 
‘Buffer Zones’ at Abortion Clinics”, Business Insider, Jun. 27, 2014. Available at: <http://www.businessin-
sider.com/supreme-court-abortion-buffer-zones-decision-2014-6>. KILLIAN, Linda. “Supreme Hypocrisy 
on Buffer Zones?”, Wall St. J.: Washington Wire, Jun. 27, 2014. Available at: <http://blogs.wsj.com/washwi-
re/2014/06/27/supreme-hypocrisy-on-buffer-zones/>.
77  Logiurato, supra note 76.
78  LITHWICK, Dahlia; WEST, Sonja. “Advice for Ferguson from the Supreme Court”. Available at:  <http://
digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_pm/190>. 
79  Freedman, supra note 8 at p. 22.
80  Idem. at p. 21.
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never integrated with mainstream medical practice or education and, even today, only 
a minority of doctors81 and hospitals offer the service.82 
Freedman further argues that the “net effect of the medical profession’s non-
-committal orientation toward abortion care” has thwarted “efforts by abortion rights 
advocates within medicine to legitimize abortion as a normal reproductive health 
need.”83 Although Freedman’s isolation-makes-targeted-violence-easier argument is 
strong, I submit that it is unclear that this isolation is the result of physicians’ non-com-
mittal attitudes towards reproductive rights per se. For instance, Sonia M. Suter critici-
zes the Supreme Court’s upholding of a partial-birth abortion ban in Gonzales v. Carhart 
because the slim evidence on which the Court relied upon to uphold that ban was “con-
tradicted by a notable group of medical experts.”84 She further remarks that this was in 
“direct contrast to an expansive vision of procreative liberty.”85 Finally, Freedman adopts 
Dr. Hodgson’s argument, which advances that by being deprived of the “protection of 
anonymity within hospital walls” and forced into isolation as freestanding clinics, RHCCs 
are “more vulnerable to violence and harassment.”86
Today, women across the U.S. choose to go to RHCCs for a wide range of reasons. 
First, Planned Parenthood affiliates participate in Title X,87 the only federal funding pro-
gram that allows family-planning clinics to supplement or reimburse Medicaid patients 
for reproductive healthcare services rendered, such as birth control, gynecological care, 
and other reproductive healthcare services that would otherwise be inaccessible to 
81  See idem. (“Since abortion was legalized in 1973, the lack of mainstream institutional and organizational 
support for it has ultimately resulted in the marginalization of abortion care into freestanding abortion clinics 
served by politically motivated physicians.”) (emphasis supplied). A close friend and medical student of obste-
trics and gynecology at the University of Puerto Rico School of Medicine — whose curricula is the same as that 
offered in medical schools on the mainland — confirmed that instruction on abortion procedure varies from 
school to school and that medical students who do not wish to participate in the procedure may opt out of it, 
even if they are doing a family-planning rotation. She made it clear that this opt-out practice is unique to the 
abortion situation.
82  See idem. at p. 22 (“Regardless of medicine’s interest in maintaining abortion turf, recent decades witnessed 
a steady decrease in the number of physicians providing abortion in their private practices and hospitals…”). 
83  Idem. at p. 21. 
84  SUTER, Sonia M. The “Repugnance” Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theories of Reproductive Rights: 
Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies. The George Washington Law Review, Washington, vol. 76, 
n. 6, pp. 1514-1598, nov./dic. 2008. p. 1587. 
85  Idem.
86  See Freedman, supra note 8 at p. 20 (citing to HODGSON, supra note 3 at p. 548). 
87  Title X is part of the United States Public Health Service Act, coded at 42 U.S.C. Ch. 6A, §§ 300 – 300a-8, 
which is devoted solely to family planning services. Note that the federal funds are prohibited from being 
used for abortion unless the woman has been a victim of sexual assault or incest. See LOBIANCO, Tom. “Plan-
ned Parenthood president grilled at House hearing”, CNN, Sep. 30, 2015. Available at: <http://www.cnn.
com/2015/09/29/politics/planned-parenthood-hearing-cecile-richards/>; MADDOW, Rachel.  “Planned Pa-
renthood president stands up to House GOP grilling”, at 5:32,  Sep. 30, 2015. Available at: <https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=bB-y2DKU6Vs>.  
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women who cannot pay full price.88 According to the Guttmacher Institute,89 Planned 
Parenthood clinics were 13% of the Title X clinics and served 37% of Title X clients.90 
Low-income women who cannot, for whatever reason,91 access hospitals or RHCCs, 
such as Planned Parenthood, oftentimes end up with “few alternatives for reproductive 
and preventive health care.”92 In 2014, a single mother from Washingtonville, Pennsyl-
vania, who lived 74 miles away from the nearest RHCC in Harrisburg, was sentenced 
to serve a twelve-to-eighteen-months’ sentence and pay a fine of $1,000 after she in-
duced an abortion upon her 16-year-old daughter, who refused to have the child.93 In 
Texas, 100,000 women have been found to be self-inducing abortions given the lack of 
RHCFs.94 Self-induced abortions are often done in dangerous conditions and involve 
additional health risks.95 
Second, many women feel these clinics are the only places where they can re-
quest reproductive services in an environment free of judgment, whether it is a simple 
gynecological checkup, birth control, a preventive screening, or an abortion.96 Accor-
ding to Planned Parenthood’s 2014-15 annual report, the Planned Parenthood 
88  About Our Fees, Planned Parenthood, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/planned-parenthood-central-
-western-new-york/patient-resources/paying-your-health-care/about-our-fees. See also National Abortion 
Federation, https://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/about_abortion/abortion_ti-
tle_x.pdf (“The majority of Title X clients are low-income, uninsured, and do not qualify for Medicaid.”).
89  The Guttmacher Institute is a “leading research and policy organization” dedicated to researching and ad-
vancing reproductive health and rights in the United States and globally “through [an] interrelated program 
of research, public education, and policy analysis.” Available at: <http://www.guttmacher.org/about>. Last ac-
cessed on Oct. 23, 2016.
90  NAPILI, Angela. Congressional Research Service, “Title X (Public Health Service Act) Family Planning Pro-
gram,” Sep. 26, 2016, at p. 18.
91  For example, the Texas Policy Evaluation Project signals the following as four reasons why women self-in-
duce abortions: (1) Not having enough money to travel to a clinic or pay for the procedure; (2) The local clinic 
was forced to close; (3) A close friend or family member recommended self-inducement; and (4) The woman 
wanted to avoid the shame of being associated with going to an RHCC. See KHAZAN, supra note 26; BEUS-
MAN, supra note 25; WELCH, Ashley. “Study: 100,000 Texas women have tried to self-induce abortion”, 
CBS News, Nov. 19, 2015. Available at: <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/100000-texas-women-have-tried-to-
-self-induce-abortion/.>. 
92  WINTER, Meaghan. “The Stealth Attack on Abortion Access”, N.Y. Times: The Opinion Pages, Nov. 12, 
2015. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/opinion/the-stealth-attack-on-abortion-access.
html?_r=3>. 
93  DEKOK, David. “Pennsylvania mother who gave daughter abortion pill gets prison”, Reuters, Sep. 
6, 2014. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-crime-pennsylvania-abortion-idUSKB-
N0H10IR20140906>.
94  KHAZAN, supra note 26; BEUSMAN, supra note 25; WELCH, supra note 91.
95  See KHAZAN, supra note 26; BEUSMAN, supra note 25; WELCH, supra note 91. 
96  MILLER, Elizabeth. “An Open Letter to a Protester Outside the Boston Planned Parenthood this Satur-
day”, Huffington Post: Huffpost Women Blog, Sep. 7, 2014: “I started going to Planned Parenthood in 1997, and 
since then have gotten all my reproductive health care there, because once inside, I feel respected and listened 
to, and able to access the medical care I need without judgement. Outside, however, it’s another story.” Availa-
ble at: <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elizabeth-miller/an-open-letter-to-a-protester-outside-the-boston-
-planned-parenthood_b_5553701.html>.
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Federation of America (PPFA) provided support to 59 independently incorporated affi-
liates, which operate the 661 health centers that served 2.5 million patients that year.97 
These affiliated clinics performed 271,539 pap smears, 363,803 breast examinations, 
provided 2,945,059 birth control-related services, conducted 651,695 HIV tests, and 
diagnosed 171,882 sexually transmitted infections (STIs).98 The medical services data 
section in that report reveals that, out of the total services provided by Planned Paren-
thood affiliates, 45% consisted of STI/STD testing and treatment, 31% was provision of 
contraception,99 13% was allocated to other women’s health services,100 7% went to 
cancer screening and prevention, 3% were abortions, and the remaining 1% consisted 
of other services.101 In total, Planned Parenthood affiliates provided 9,455,582 services 
for the 2014-15 year.102 
Despite the variety of services offered at RHCFs besides abortion, RHCFs con-
tinue to be referred to as “abortion clinics,” a phrase U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg has openly objected to because it attaches prejudice to a facility that, 
at the end of the day, provides medically necessary services.103 
2.2.  Who is Seeking an Abortion? 
The incongruence between abortion opponents’ intended and actual audience 
is a constant source of frustration for women who seek reproductive healthcare at an 
RHCF. A Boston woman narrated her personal experience with abortion opponents: 
“You could be going there, like in my case, for my yearly exam and I’m getting called 
‘baby-killer.’ . . . you can’t believe someone just yelled at you on the way to the doc-
tor.”104 Sarah Cyr-Mutty, a community relations coordinator for a Boston clinic, says that 
the crowd of people outside the facility makes the atmosphere tenser, more chaotic, 
and more uncomfortable for the patients. “No one wants to drive up to their doctor’s 
97  Planned Parenthood 2014-15 Annual Report at p. 5 [hereinafter 2014-15 Annual Report]. Available at: < ht-
tps://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/2114/5089/0863/2014-2015_PPFA_Annual_Report_.pdf >.
98  Idem. at p. 28.
99  See idem. at p. 29 for further contraception data breakdown.
100  Michelle Ye He Lee defines “other women’s health services” as pregnancy tests and “prenatal services.” LEE, 
Michelle Ye Hee. “Fact Checker For Planned Parenthood abortion stats: ‘3 percent’ and ’94 percent’ are 
both misleading”, The Washington Post, Aug. 12, 2015. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
fact-checker/wp/2015/08/12/for-planned-parenthood-abortion-stats-3-percent-and-94-percent-are-both-
-misleading/.>.
101  2014-15 Annual Report, supra note 97 at p. 29. 
102  Idem. at p. 30.
103  “The Court’s hostility to the right Roe and Casey secured is not concealed. Throughout, the opinion refers to 
obstetrician-gynecologists and surgeons who perform abortions not by the titles of their medical specialties, 
but by the pejorative label ‘abortion doctor.’” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 186-87 (2007).
104  See FILIPOVIC, supra note 11 (Pia’s testimony in video).
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office and see over 100 people standing outside.”105 Another patient who was appro-
aching the clinic entrance refused to speak to a woman handing out an anti-abortion 
pamphlet: “Honestly, I’m having a miscarriage right now, so I really don’t feel like talking 
to you.”106 A demonstrator who observed the exchange dismissed the patient’s remarks 
by claiming, “That’s usually what they say . . . The new abortion mentality is no more of 
the ‘choice’ word. The thing is to claim that abortion is just a miscarriage.”107 
Women who seek reproductive healthcare from RHCCs do so for a myriad of 
reasons. The reasons for seeking an abortion specifically are just as diverse.108 In light 
of the recent Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt case,109 the Center for Reproductive 
Rights110 launched a campaign called “Draw the Line,”111 which gathered women’s di-
verse abortion stories and showcased them on the project’s website. The collection of 
stories reveals that, while some women seek an abortion to end an unplanned preg-
nancy, others do so due to medical conditions or reasons beyond their control, such as 
epilepsy or an ectopic pregnancy.112 
It is impossible for an anti-abortion demonstrator to ascertain that a patient en-
tering an RHCF is doing so to receive an abortion. In order to ascertain that a woman is 
in fact seeking an abortion, an anti-abortion demonstrator would be forced to ask the 
patient directly. While the patient may have the option to decline to respond, often-
times ignoring the demonstrators means enduring uncalled-for insults or yelling. Of 
course, it is just as impossible for patients to ascertain which demonstrators will desist 
immediately upon being ignored and which ones will continue prying. A woman who 
does not want to risk being yelled at, therefore, may feel like she has no choice but 
to explain herself. Is our position as a society that a political group’s First Amendment 
rights are more important than a population’s right to privacy and to obtain the repro-
ductive healthcare they need and are entitled to? 
105  PEARL, Diana. “Free Speech Outside the Abortion Clinic”, The Atlantic, Mar. 19, 2015. Available at: <http://
www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/03/free-speech-outside-the-abortion-clinic/388162/>.
106  FILIPOVIC, supra note 11.
107  Idem.
108  See CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS. “Actresses Share Real Abortion Stories: The Draw the Line 
Monologues.” Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwFpFirvF7E>. 
109  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 790 F.3d 563 (2015), granting certiorari. In Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately struck down the challenged Texas sta-
tute, holding that the same imposed an undue burden on women’s constitutionally protected right to access 
abortion.
110  The Center for Reproductive Rights is  “the only global legal advocacy organization dedicated to reproduc-
tive rights.” CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS. “About Us”. Available at: <http://www.reproductiverights.
org/about-us>. Last accessed Oct. 23, 2016. 
111  Draw the Line, <http://www.drawtheline.org/>. Last accessed Apr. 19, 2016.
112  See CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS Video, supra note 108. 
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2.3.  Who is a “Sidewalk Counselor”? 
The McCullen Court stated that “sidewalk counseling” involved “offering infor-
mation about alternatives to abortion and help pursuing those options.”113 However, it 
failed to explain what the requirements are to be accurately denominated a “sidewalk 
counselor.” Throughout the many phases of the litigation, Petitioners in the McCullen 
case described themselves as “sidewalk counselors.”114 The Court adopted this charac-
terization and noted that these individuals “approach and talk to women outside such 
facilities, attempting to dissuade them from having abortions.”115 Petitioners’ argument 
worked. The State of Massachusetts conveyed the violent history of harassment against 
RHCFs, but did not press the Court on the “sidewalk counselor” point.116 Despite this 
being a crucial distinction in the case, the Court failed to define who counts as a sidewa-
lk counselor and who crosses the line to be fairly characterized as a more dangerous 
protester. In criticizing the Court’s ruling in the McCullen case, Lithwick and West highli-
ght the Court’s ambiguity in this regard, stating:
In the abortion clinic context, counselors are the people who have the goal of providing 
a message to women entering the clinics that abortion is bad. These people, the court 
asserts ‘are not protesters.’ We’ll know them when we see them, because they might 
pass out literature instead of carrying signs. They might also say, ‘Good morning,’ before 
telling you that abortion is bad. They have a ‘caring demeanor,’ a ‘calm tone of voice,’ 
and ‘maintain direct eye contact.’ They tend to be gray-haired grandmothers. ‘Counse-
lors’ also have been spotted taking a moment to ‘pray the rosary.’ (Protesters, the court, 
cautions, do things like carry signs, chant together, or sometimes engage in ‘more ag-
gressive’ tactics like face-to-face confrontation.)117
Lithwick and West have a point: These so-called counselors are self-proclai-
med.118 Anti-abortion activists, or self-proclaimed sidewalk counselors, often approach 
the women entering and exiting RHCCs under the assumption that they are seeking 
an abortion at the facility in the hopes that they can engage the women and offer 
113  134 S. Ct. at p. 2527.
114  See supra note 61 at *Add. 100a-101a (“Plaintiff Eleanor McCullen engages in sidewalk counseling . . . She 
frequently works with another sidewalk counselor . . .”).
115  Idem. at p. 2525.
116  See, generally, Oral Argument, supra note 72.
117  See LITHWICK and WEST, supra note 78.
118  See e.g., 134 S. Ct. at p. 2549, where the Court accepted Petitioners’ self-description as “sidewalk counselors” 
without further inquiry into such designation: “A sidewalk counselor, such as petitioners, enters the buffer zone, 
approaches the woman and says, ‘If you have doubts about an abortion, let me try to answer any questions you 
may have. The clinic will not give you good information.’” See also FILIPOVIC, supra note 11 (“Ruth and Evelyn 
call themselves ‘sidewalk counselors,’ not protesters.”) (emphasis supplied).
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information about alternatives to abortion. 119 For instance, Petitioner Eleanor McCul-
len — the lead plaintiff in the McCullen case — typically initiates a conversation like 
this: “Good morning, may I give you my literature? Is there anything I can do for you? 
I’m available if you have any questions.”120 There are three evident problems with this 
approach. First, how can Ms. McCullen realistically ascertain that she is approaching 
someone who is indeed seeking to have an abortion? Second, assuming the woman is 
in fact seeking an abortion, Ms. McCullen’s disposition to answer any questions further 
assumes that the woman she has approached is not — or chooses not to be — cons-
cious of what she is doing and aware of her options. The Hill Court explicitly acknowle-
dged that people trying to access the clinics are in “particularly vulnerable physical and 
emotional conditions” that warrant the State’s protection from “unwanted encounters, 
confrontations, and even assaults.”121 More often than not, people in particularly vulne-
rable physical and emotional conditions — such as women who might be seeking an 
abortion — will have weighed their options mindfully before arriving at a conclusion 
as to what is the best course of action given their specific circumstances. Third, if the 
woman is in fact seeking an abortion, how can Ms. McCullen realistically help? Will she 
cover the medical expenses for any medical complications the woman may experience 
as a result of the pregnancy? Will Ms. McCullen provide financial support to the woman 
who carries the pregnancy to term and her child? Absent concrete criteria for someone 
to be designated a “sidewalk counselor,” is it the Court’s position that a “Hello, can I give 
you my literature?” or the outward characteristics and demeanor of a person are enou-
gh for them to claim “sidewalk counselor” status? One must wonder why Ms. McCullen, 
who has been described as “a sweet, cheerful grandmother from Massachusetts,”122 was 
specifically chosen as the lead plaintiff for the litigation. 
From the perspective of women who seek reproductive healthcare at an RHCF, 
anti-abortion activism can range from being a simple nuisance to borderline, if not 
actual, harassment. In connection to this, Professor Chemerinsky noted that, “…the 
Court gave insufficient weight to the rights of those who are using or working at clinics 
and want to be free from verbal and physical assaults.”123 He further characterized the 
Court’s opinion as an “open invitation to arbitrary line drawing.”124
119  134 S. Ct. at p. 2527.
120  Idem.
121  Hill, 530 U.S. at p. 729.
122  BOWMAN, Matt. “A Quiet Grandmother Wins One for Free Speech at the Supreme Court”, Wash. Times, 
Jul. 1, 2014. Available at: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/1/quiet-grandmother-wins-one-
-free-speech-supreme-cou/.>.
123  CHEMERINSKY, Erwin. Appearances can be Deceiving. Green Bag Online, Washington, vol. 17, n. 4, p. 389-
404, jun./aug. 2014, at p. 397.
124  Idem.
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2.4.  Buffer Zones in Other Contexts
The use of buffer zones has not been limited to reproductive health clinics.125 
Polling places, military funerals, government buildings, and federal courthouses, inclu-
ding the U.S. Supreme Court, are some of the facilities or contexts that reap the benefits 
of having a protective buffer zone around their premises. The Supreme Court’s buffer 
zone law, for example, makes it “unlawful for protesters to demonstrate on Supreme 
Court building grounds.”126 
2.4.1.  The (Military) Funeral Context
In Snyder v. Phelps,127 Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder had been killed 
in the line of duty in Iraq.128 The details for the fallen soldier’s funeral services, which 
would be held in Maryland, were announced in the local newspapers.129 Members of 
the Westboro Baptist Church of Topeka, Kansas, who were of the view that God punishes 
the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality in the military by killing American 
soldiers, decided to travel to Maryland and picket Snyder’s funeral procession.130 Stan-
ding in a land adjacent to a public street, the Westboro picketers sang hymns and dis-
played signs that stated, “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “America is Doomed,” 
“Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in 
Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” “God Hates Fags,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and “God Hates You.”131 
Snyder’s father was not able to see what was written on the signs until he saw a news 
broadcast of the event later that evening.132 He then filed a suit in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Maryland based on tort law against the Westboro picketers and the 
Church itself, alleging defamation, publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (IIED), intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy.133 After the jury 
awarded Snyder $2.9 million134 in damages at the district court level, the Court of Appe-
als sided with the Defendants’ contention that the First Amendment “fully protected 
125  See ANNEAR, Steve. “The Supreme Court Technically Has Its Own 252-Foot Buffer Zone”, Boston Daily, 
Jun 26, 2014. Available at: <http://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/blog/2014/06/26/supreme-court-buffer-
-zone-regulations/>.
126  ANNEAR, supra note 125.
127  Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
128  Idem. at p. 448.
129  Idem.
130  See idem.
131  Idem. 
132  Idem. at p. 449.
133  Idem. at pp. 449-50.
134  The District Court later remitted the punitive damages award to $2.1 million. 562 U.S. at p. 450.
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Westboro’s speech”135 and reversed the judgment.136 On certiorari, the question before 
the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the First Amendment protects church members 
picketing near a soldier’s funeral service from tort liability.137 The question would turn 
on whether the Westboro Church members’ speech was a matter of public or private 
concern.138
The Supreme Court noted that the First Amendment grants special protection 
to speech related to public concerns,139 but that the same rigorous protection does not 
extend to speech related to private matters.140 In order to decide whether Westboro’s 
speech was related to private or public matters, the Court employed the Connick test,141 
which requires the examination of the content, form, and context of the speech as re-
vealed by the whole record.142 The Court ruled that the content of Westboro’s message 
pertained to broader public issues and that the context of the funeral procession did 
not alter that conclusion.143 Recognizing that Westboro’s speech was also subject to 
time, place, and manner restrictions, the Court concluded that Westboro was exempt 
from tort liability because the picketing was conducted about 1,000 feet away from the 
church, without disrupting the funeral.144 
“Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sor-
row, and — as it did here — inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react 
to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course 
— to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public 
debate.”145 
Both parties in this case benefitted from the buffer zone in place. Even when 
the funeral procession passed within 200 or 300 feet of the picket site, the distance 
prevented Mr. Snyder from seeing what was written on the picket signs or hearing the 
protesting until he watched the news later that evening.146 Had the picketers disrup-
135  Idem.
136  Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2009). 
137  See 562 U.S. at p. 447.
138  Idem at pp. 444, 451.
139  See idem. at pp. 451-52 (drawing the distinction between matters of public and private concern). 
140  See idem. at p. 452.
141  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 
749, 758-59, 761 (1985).
142  562 U.S. at p. 444: “To determine whether speech is of public or private concern, th[e] Court must indepen-
dently examine the ‘content, form, and context,’ of the speech ‘as revealed by the whole record.’”
143  562 U.S. at pp. 454-56.
144  Idem. at p. 457. 
145  Idem. at pp. 460-61.
146  Idem. at pp. 449, 462.
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ted the funeral procession, made it so that Mr. Snyder was able to see what the signs 
were displaying or hear the picketers’ message, his IIED claim would have been stron-
ger and Westboro would have probably been found liable. It was the church members’ 
obedience to the authorities’ instructions as to how to stage their demonstration that 
shielded them from liability.147 
At least seventeen states148 have enacted state statutes that explicitly prohibit 
protesting or picketing funeral processions in order to protect families’ grieving pro-
cess.149 Out of those seventeen states, at least Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming — fifteen states — enforce protective 
buffer zones around the funeral procession or site, ranging from 100 feet to 1,500 fe-
et.150 In addition, some states regulate when the demonstration might take place. For 
instance, Arkansas prohibits picketing the funeral during and within the thirty minu-
tes immediately preceding or following the ceremony.151 Georgia, on the other hand, 
prohibits demonstrations targeted at a memorial service from occurring “at any time 
one hour prior to, during, or one hour after the posted time.”152 The classification of the 
offense also varies by state. For example, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, South Dakota, and 
Wyoming are some of the states that classify the offense as some kind of misdemeanor, 
while California imposes criminal penalties.153 If our laws recognize that mourning re-
latives’ vulnerable emotional state merit protection, why is a woman’s emotional state 
and desire for privacy treated differently by the courts? 
147  Idem. at pp. 448-49.
148  Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2930 (2011)), Arkansas (Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-230 (West 2013)), Califor-
nia (Cal. Penal § 594.37 (West 2013)), Colorado (Colo. Rev. St. Ann. § 13-21-126 (West 2006)), Florida (Fla. Stat. 
§ 871.015 (2014)), Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-34.2 (West 2006)), Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 525.155 
(West 2007)), Massachusetts (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272 § 42A, Mississippi (Miss. Code Ann. § 97-35-18 (West 
2006)), Missouri (Mo. Ann. Stat. § 574.160 (West 2014)), Montana (Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-116 (West 2007)), 
Nebraska (Neb. Rev. St. Ann. § 28-1320.02 (West 2011)), New Hampshire (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 644:2-b (2007)), 
Oklahoma (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21 § 1380 (West 2011)), Pennsylvania (tit. 18 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7517 
(West 2006)), South Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws § 22-13-17 (2006)), and Wyoming (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-6-105 
(West 2011)).  
149  For example, Colo. Rev. St. Ann. § 13-21-126(1)(b) explicitly recognizes that “[f ]uneral picketing disrupts the 
grieving process” and that it “intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress on the mourners.” Subsection (A)(1)
(b) of Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21 § 1380 and Subsection (a)(2) of tit. 18 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7517 provide 
that “the interests of families in privately and peacefully mourning the loss of deceased relatives are violated” 
when funerals or commemorative services are “targeted for picketing and other public demonstrations…”   
150  See supra note 148.
151  Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-230(b)(3). 
152  Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-34.2(b)(4). 
153  Cal. Penal § 594.37(b) provides: “Any violation of subdivision (a) is punishable by a fine not exceeding one 
thousand dollars ($1,000), imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding six months, or by both that fine and 
imprisonment.”
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2.4.2. The Polling Place Context
Buffer zone laws are also enforced around polling places.154 For example, in 
1992, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Tennessee election sta-
tute, which prohibited “the display of campaign posters, signs or other campaign ma-
terials, distribution of campaign materials, and solicitation of votes for or against any 
person, political party, or position on a question” within 100 feet of entrances to polling 
places.155 The statute allowed the authorities to extend the election-day “campaign-free 
zone”156 by private action based on the size of the population.157 The buffer zone sta-
tute was challenged on First Amendment grounds158 because (1) it regulated political 
speech, (2) the regulation of the political speech was occurring in a public forum, and 
(3) the regulation was based on the content of the speech.159 The State of Tennessee 
articulated two interests served by the buffer zone statute. First, the statute protects 
the rights of its citizens to vote freely for the candidates of their choice.160 Second, that 
the restriction protects the right to vote in an election conducted with integrity and 
reliability.161 Notwithstanding the Court’s finding that the statute was content-based, 
the Court also recognized the State’s interests in “protecting voters from confusion and 
undue influence” were legitimate and compelling162 and that the law as written was 
necessary to serve those interests.163 The plurality acknowledged that it is rare for a 
law to survive the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis and upheld the constitutionality of 
the law.164 Finally, and most significantly for our purposes, the Court admitted that “[v]
oter intimidation and election fraud are successful precisely because they are difficult 
to detect.165 If an individual purporting to intimidate voters is hard to discern, how can 
the authorities, clinic staff, and women be expected to discern a violent anti-abortion 
protester from a peaceful one in the RHCF context? In fact, an officer who was present 
on the day John C. Salvi III opened fire on two Brookline clinics and killed two women 
154  HO, Daniel E.; SCHAUER Frederick. Testing the Marketplace of Ideas. New York University Law Review, 
New York, vol. 90, n. 4, pp. 1160-1228, oct. 2015. p. 1178. 
155  Idem.
156  Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193 (1992).
157  Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-7-111(d) (West 2003). 
158  504 U.S. at p. 195.
159  Idem. at p. 196.
160  Idem. at p. 198.
161  Idem. at p. 199.
162  Idem.
163  Idem. at pp. 210-11.
164  Idem. at p. 211.
165  Idem. at p. 208.
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 1, p. 43-68, jan./abr. 2017.
Karla A. Vergara Pérez
64 
stated there was nothing about Salvi’s demeanor that suggested that he was about to 
violently attack one of the clinics.166 
2.4.3. The Buffer Zone Around the Supreme Court
In 1949, a federal statute established a buffer zone around the U.S. Supreme 
Court grounds.167 Currently, the statute, which is codified at Section 6135 of Title 40, 
consists of two clauses within one sentence.168 The first clause, referred to as the As-
semblages Clause by the Supreme Court, makes it unlawful “to parade, stand, or move 
in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds.”169 The se-
cond clause, known as the Display Clause, makes it unlawful to “display in the Building 
and grounds a flag, banner, or device designed or adopted to bring into public notice 
a party, organization, or movement.”170 It is worth noting that the statute was written 
in such a way as to include the plaza in front of the Supreme Court building as part of 
its “grounds.”171 
The constitutionality of the statute was challenged by a college student who 
was arrested for displaying a sign on the Supreme Court’s plaza in the Hodge v. Talkin 
case. The student, Harold Hodge, Jr., brought the action on First and Fifth Amendment 
grounds, alleging that the Assemblages and Display clauses were overbroad and un-
constitutionally vague and, thus, unconstitutionally restrictive upon his right to free 
speech.172 After the District Court had entered summary judgment for the student, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the Supreme Court plaza 
constituted a “nonpublic forum” for purposes of the First Amendment and that the sta-
tute was a reasonable limitation on speech.173 A petition for certiorari review was filed 
on January 6, 2016 with the Supreme Court, but the Court denied certiorari on May 16, 
2016.174 
The applicable First Amendment analysis was dependent on whether the 
plaza constituted a public forum or a nonpublic forum. In the Hodge opinion, Judge 
166  CHILDRESS, Sarah. “Murder on Abortion Row”, Frontline (PBS), Jun. 26, 2014. Available at: <http://www.
pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/social-issues/watch-murder-on-abortion-row/>.
167  JACOBY, Jeff. “Strike down the Supreme Court’s ‘buffer zone’”, Boston Globe: Opinion, Sep. 6, 2015. 
Available at: <https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/09/05/free-speech-buffer-zone-supreme-court-
-plaza-ludicrous/Ih3ImBDFgVNAvu7bLHFuRP/story.html>.
168  40 U.S.C. § 6135; Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1149 (2015). 
169  40 U.S.C. § 6135; 799 F.3d at p. 1149.
170  Supra note 169.
171  799 F.3d at pp. 1149, 1150-51. See 40 U.S.C. § 6101(b)(1) (defining the limits of the Supreme Court grounds, 
which extend to the curbs of the sidewalks, but exclude the sidewalks themselves). 
172  799 F.3d at p. 1154.
173  Idem. at p. 1162.
174  See Hodge v. Talkin, 136 S. Ct. 2009, denying certiorari. 
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Srinivasan cited a statement authored by Justice Breyer to explain why the plaza is 
considered a nonpublic forum for First Amendment purposes: “Starting at the Court’s 
western plaza, Gilbert’s plan leads visitors along a carefully choreographed, climbing 
path that ultimately ends at the courtroom itself.”175 Because “the government retains 
substantially greater leeway to limit expressive conduct in such an area…” — namely, 
a nonpublic area — , “the government can impose reasonable restrictions on speech” 
as long as no one viewpoint is repressed.176 The Court reasoned that the statute served 
the government’s “interests in preserving decorum in the area of a courthouse and in 
assuring the appearance (and actuality) of a judiciary uninfluenced by public opinion 
and pressure,” thus concluding that the law was a constitutional restriction.177 The opi-
nion considered “the sidewalk area directly in front of the Court’s plaza” evidence of the 
statute’s reasonableness.178
Speech can be powerful. As a nation, we have chosen to protect hurtful speech 
to not stifle public debate. We have, however, also chosen to grant grieving families at 
a funeral procession with the minimum protection and courtesy of a buffer zone so 
they may mourn in peace. We have also chosen to uphold campaign-free zones arou-
nd polling places to protect voters from undue influence and intimidation. Our federal 
courts have chosen to uphold a buffer zone statute around the U.S. Supreme Court to 
preserve decorum and an uninfluenced judiciary. We have, somehow, found ways to 
make these buffer zones coexist with First Amendment rights. What makes reproduc-
tive healthcare clinics so different? Why can we not extend the same minimum protec-
tion to women? Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of the UC Irvine School of Law and renowned 
constitutional law professor, has argued: “Those going into clinics should not have to be 
yelled at, shown graphic photographs, called names, and made to fear for their safety. 
Women exercising their constitutional rights should be protected from harassment.”179 
No woman who seeks the reproductive healthcare she is entitled to — whatever it may 
be — should feel forced or compelled to explain her circumstances and why she is se-
eking medical attention from an RHCF when approached by a stranger on a sidewalk 
— regardless of whether she is in fact emotionally vulnerable or not.
175  J. Stephen Breyer, Statement Concerning the Supreme Court’s Front Entrance, 2009 S. Ct. J. 831, 831 (2010).
176  799 F.3d at p. 1150.
177  Idem.
178  Idem.
179  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 123, at pp. 397-98. 
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3. CONCLUSION
In the Hill decision, the Court recognized that healthcare facilities are surroun-
ded by unique concerns and circumstances. The Court reasoned that hospital patients 
are oftentimes in a vulnerable emotional state, which begs for a comforting and su-
pportive atmosphere. In the Snyder decision, the Court recognized that the Westboro 
church members were free from liability because they abided by the buffer zone laws in 
place in order to protect the grieving family’s frail emotional state during the mourning 
process. The Supreme Court upheld a Tennessee statute around polling places in order 
to protect voters from intimidation and undue influence. The U.S. Supreme Court’s own 
buffer zone has been upheld to preserve the Court’s decorum and an uninfluenced ju-
diciary. Why are courts hesitant to extend the same minimum protection to the women 
who seek access to RHCFs? Are these women not entitled to privacy? What makes the 
reproductive healthcare context so different from other contexts? My research revealed 
no evidence of a need for protective buffer zones around hospitals. If an abortion may 
also be performed in a mainstream hospital, why are they not also subject to similar 
aggressions? What makes RHCCs so different in nature? 
If upholding a buffer zone statute may be considered an endorsement of the 
pro-choice viewpoint over the anti-abortion movement, then striking down said sta-
tute can be interpreted as a prioritization of the anti-abortion viewpoint. I suggest this 
binary is too broad. First, women seek reproductive care from physicians and staff at 
RHCFs on a daily basis for a wide variety of reasons. Many women recur to these clinics 
seeking routine pap smears, birth control, breast cancer and STD/STI screenings, and 
many other services that might be more costly or more time-consuming if received at 
a hospital. Moreover, sometimes an RHCF is the only available health facility for miles. 
Second, the women who in fact seek an abortion more often than not do so after ha-
ving weighed their options heavily, wondered about the looming possibility of regret, 
concluding that this is the best choice for them and their families. Failing to uphold 
buffer zone statutes that protect these women’s privacy leaves them with two choices: 
To either ignore anti-abortion demonstrators at the risk of being yelled at or divulge 
the reasons why they are seeking medical care at these facilities. Judge Karen Schreier, 
a South Dakota federal judge, wrote in an opinion: “Forcing a woman to divulge to a 
stranger at a pregnancy help center the fact that she has chosen to undergo an abor-
tion humiliates and degrades her as a human being.”180 The buffer zone debate has 
long been articulated as a First Amendment issue, but I suggest it is more practically a 
women’s privacy and dignity issue. 
180  Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1060 (2011); “The Courts Step 
In”, N.Y. Times: Opinion, Jul. 13, 2011. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/opinion/14thurs1.
html?_r=0.>. 
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The McCullen Court unanimously asserted that, “petitioners are not protesters,” 
but failed to provide further guidance as to where to draw the line. Indeed, who counts 
as a sidewalk counselor? Is it anybody who self-proclaims to be one? Is it an elderly 
woman handing out a leaflet? Does a 35-year-old man standing silently outside a clinic 
with a sign displaying an aborted fetus count as one or does he cross the line? Is he 
deemed a more aggressive protester? Why?  
Drawing the line between who is an aggressive abortion opponent and who is 
not is difficult not just for the Supreme Court, but also for the women who seek repro-
ductive healthcare and for the authorities of the State that are trying to maintain the 
peace. Similarly, assuming abortion opponents approach these women with the best 
of intentions, it is nearly impossible for them to ascertain who among the many women 
approaching an RHCC is seeking an abortion without invading their privacy. As a result, 
they target every woman who seems to be approaching the nearest clinic, regardless of 
the reason. What are these women supposed to do? Are they supposed to tell a stran-
ger they are not seeking an abortion to appease them? Are they supposed to ignore 
them in the hopes that they will desist? If they opt for ignoring them, are these women 
supposed to endure being yelled at? Are they supposed to tolerate being called “ba-
by-killer” or “gross” for the sake of abortion opponents’ First Amendment rights? What 
about women who are seeking an abortion? Do they not have the right to their privacy? 
Do they not have the right to have a few moments to themselves before making what 
might be the hardest choice they have ever made? If we consider protecting mourning, 
emotionally vulnerable families during funeral proceedings from further emotional dis-
tress a legitimate state interest, why is a woman’s emotional vulnerability not regarded 
in the same way? If we are willing to enforce buffer zones around polling places to 
protect voters from voter intimidation and undue influences, so as to preserve the inte-
grity of our democratic system, why are we reluctant to extend the same consideration 
to women who feel intimidated for seeking the reproductive care they are entitled to 
and need?   
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s buffer zone, buffer zones around RHCCs are not 
meant to preserve decorum or to assure the appearance and actuality of an uninfluen-
ced judiciary. Buffer zones around RHCFs are necessary to protect patients from unso-
licited advice, “counsel,” and even harassment. They are needed to safeguard women’s 
right to privacy. Regardless of which side of the debate one subscribes to, no American 
will contend that a fellow citizen has a lesser right to privacy. Restricting the time, place, 
and manner in which anti-abortion demonstrations happen would only marginally re-
duce the area where the free speech may take place in exchange for patients’ increased 
sense of respect, privacy, and overall human dignity.
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